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Abstract
We consider a model where wealth-constrained entrepreneurs have
private information about the qualities of available investment projects.
We show that some "high risk-high return" projects will receive ex-
ternal nancing even if they are not socially protable. Some "low
risk-low return" projects will not be funded even if they are socially
protable. Government interventions can improve equilibrium. Opti-
mal government policy may include corporate taxation, subsidies or
other instruments. A universal tax on all entrepreneurs with limited
liability is not optimal.
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1 Introduction.
Traditional "folk" opinion is that corporate tax is the price corporations pay
for the right of limited liability. However, there is no formal proof of this
argument. Musgrave and Musgrave (1980) and Rosen (2004) noticed that it
is hard to believe in the link between the real amount of benets corporations
receive from limited liability and the magnitude of corporate taxation.
We turn to asymmetric information to address the issue. We consider an
environment where entrepreneurs choose between risky projects, with high
potential protability, and safe projects, with minimal protability. An en-
trepreneurs incentive depends on the nancing contracts. There are two
contracts available: one with limited liability and one with unlimited liabil-
ity. The entrepreneurs choose contracts based on a trade-o¤between interest
rates (unlimited liability contracts have a lower interest rate) and a loss in the
bad state (limited liability contracts do not imply a loss for the entrepreneur
in the bad state). If the project fails and an entrepreneur faces unlimited
limited liability, then in addition to be forced to cover a rms loss the en-
trepreneur sustains additional costs such as, for example, relocation costs
(in case he has to sell his house) and reputation costs.1 We argue that the
equilibrium is ine¢ cient: some entrepreneurs use limited liability contracts
and invest ine¢ ciently (overinvestment problem) and some of them do not
undertake socially e¢ cient projects (underinvestment). Although corporate
taxation reduces the incentive to overinvest it does not mitigate the under-
investment problem. Optimal government policy includes a combination of
corporate taxation, subsidies and other instruments.
2 The model.
Consider a set of entrepreneurs, indexed by j, with investment projects avail-
able. Projects require the same amount of external nancing equal to 1. In
the case of success a project generates a cash ow Fj and a cash ow of zero
otherwise.2 The probability of success is pj. There is also a risk-free invest-
1Becker and Fuest (2007) explore a di¤erent approach based on entrepreneurs oppor-
tunities to o¤-set losses and come to a di¤erent conclusion regarding optimal government
policy. See comment in footnote 2 regarding the model in their paper.
2The present model is more general than one in Becker and Fuest (2007) where the
cash ows are the same across the projects in the case of projects success.
2
ment project with cash ow I < Fj   1. There are two types of nancing
available for the risky project. One is a limited liability contract (LLC). Here,
an entrepreneur borrows an amount 1 from a bank. In the case of success, the
entrepreneur pays D to the bank. If the project fails the parties have no re-
turns. Alternatively, the entrepreneur can use an unlimited liability contract
(ULC). It is assumed that each entrepreneur has su¢ cient collateral, equal
to 1. Hence, ULC represents a risk-free debt for the bank and thus has a face
value of 1. If an entrepreneur has ULC and the project fails then in addition
to losing collateral there is cost r for entrepreneur, r > 0. For instance, if
the entrepreneur has to sell his house there is cost of new house search and
moving cost. There might also be additional costs for family members due
to moving to a new location. Fj and pj are the private information of each
entrepreneur. Banks do not have this information. Entrepreneurs and banks
are risk-neutral.
3 Underinvestment and overinvestment.
The following equation separates socially e¢ cient risky projects from socially
ine¢ cient projects:
pjFj   1 = I (1)
If the left side is greater, the project is socially e¢ cient and vice versa.
For marginal entrepreneurs (marginal entrepreneurs projects satisfy (1))
@pj=@Fj =  (1 + I)=F 2j < 0 and @2pj=@F 2j = 2(1 + I)=F 3j > 0.
We have the following set of equations which determine an equilibrium.
The choice between the LLC and the risk-free project is given by:
pj(Fj  D) = I (2)
where D = 1=p and p is the average probability of success among the
entrepreneurs with a LLC. For this equation we also have @pj=@Fj < 0 and
@2pj=@F
2
j > 0. If an entrepreneurs project satises (2) he is indi¤erent
between the LLC and the risk-free project. If the left side is greater, the
entrepreneur chooses the LLC and vice versa.
The choice between the LLC and the ULC is given by:
pj(Fj   1=p) = pj(Fj   1)  (1  pj)(1 + r)
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This equation can be rewritten as:
pj =
1 + r
r + 1=p
(3)
and the choice between the ULC and the risk-free project is given by:
pj(Fj   1)  (1  pj)(1 + r) = I (4)
The analysis of equations (1)-(4) reveals the following. (a) From (1) and
(2) the marginal entrepreneur with pj = p is indi¤erent between the LLC
and the risk-free project. (b) From (1) and (3) marginal entrepreneurs with
pj = p
 prefer the LLC to the ULC. This is because the right side of (3) is
greater than p since r > 0. (c) Marginal entrepreneurs prefer the risk-free
project to the ULC. To see this let us rewrite (1) and (4) as follows:
pj = (1 + I)=Fj (5)
pj = (I + 1 + r)=(Fj + r) (6)
The right side of (6) is greater than that of (5) because Fj > 1 + I .
Figure 1 illustrates the equilibrium decision-making for the entrepreneurs.
The thick lines represent equations (1)-(4). Letters f , l and u denote the areas
where the entrepreneurs choose the risk-free contract, the limited liability
contract, or the unlimited liability contract respectively.
-
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Figure 1. Overinvestment and underinvestment.
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From the remark (a) above the point of intersection of (1) and (2) has
the probability of success pj = p. The intersection is unique since the slope
of (1) is greater than that of (2):  1+I
F 2j
=   p2
1+I
>   I
(Fj D)2 =  
p2
I
. From
(b) the line corresponding to (3) lies above the line pj = p. From (c) the
line corresponding to (4) lies above the line corresponding to (1).
As follows from Figure 1, there are two areas of ine¢ ciency. Firms in
area A1 underinvest and rms in area A2 overinvest (and use the LLC).
What explains these results?
First, consider entrepreneurs with unlimited liability. Suppose C = 0.
The unlimited liability contract is a risk-free debt for the bank. Thus, the
entrepreneurs expected earnings equal the projects expected earnings (pjFj)
reduced by the payment to the bank (which equals the investment cost 1).
This means that under unlimited liability, entrepreneurs will not invest in
socially ine¢ cient projects because they are always better-o¤ with the risk-
free investment (eq. (1)). The same holds if C > 0 because in this case
entrepreneurs earn even less than when C = 0 (line (4) lies above the line
(1)).
Secondly, consider entrepreneurs with limited liability. From (1) marginal
entrepreneurs have projects with equal expected values. In area A2 marginal
entrepreneurs have lower probabilities of success than p (the average prob-
ability of success among entrepreneurs with limited liability contracts). A
higher probability of default is detrimental for creditors. Thus, marginal
entrepreneurs in area A2 make a positive surplus compared to the symmet-
ric information case. This implies that there are some entrepreneurs with a
lower probability of success than marginal entrepreneurs which will choose
limited liability investment in risky projects (similar to the asset substitu-
tion e¤ect).3 On the other hand, marginal entrepreneurs in area A1 have a
higher probability of success which is benecial for creditors and harmful for
shareholders because they receive a lower return in the good state. Thus,
some entrepreneurs with a high probability of success will not invest in so-
cially e¢ cient risky projects. Optimal government policy will include a tax
on entrepreneurs with limited liability contracts and high earnings (high Fj)
and subsidies for entrepreneurs with limited or unlimited liability contracts
and low earnings (low Fj).4 This will move line (2) toward line (1) reducing
3DeMeza and Webb (1987).
4Mathematical calculations of the optimal tax rate and the amount of subsidies are
omitted for brevity. Note that they depend on whether the government is able to observe
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areas A1 and A2.5 A universal tax on all entrepreneurs with limited liability
is never optimal because it will move line (2) up and to the right, increasing
area A1.
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